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A MEASURE OF HARMONY:
THE ORCHESTRATION OF RULE 32(H) WITH
THE “DISCORDANT SYMPHONY” OF BOOKER
LEEANN ROSNICK†
ABSTRACT
Sentencing in the post-Booker world presents a variety of
challenges and uncertainties for the courts, Congress, and the general
public. This Note examines one such challenge, considering the
difficulties surrounding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) in
light of Booker. The Note develops the history of both Rule 32(h) and
the Booker decision, analyzes changes and suggested amendments to
Rule 32(h), and concludes that the conflict between Rule 32(h) and
Booker can be easily resolved with slight alterations to the language
of Rule 32(h).

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,1 which
rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, heralded
confusing changes in the federal sentencing system. As Justice
Antonin Scalia anticipated, Booker gave rise to “a discordant
symphony of different standards, varying from court to court and
judge to judge.”2 Substantively, Booker starkly diverged from the
sentencing regime previously established by Congress.3 Procedurally,
Booker complicated the sentencing system by failing to give lower
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1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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courts any idea of how much deference they should give the
Guidelines and by failing to provide certain safety nets for
4
defendants. According to Justice Scalia, the majority’s approach was
“rather like deleting the ingredients portion of a recipe and telling the
5
cook to proceed with the preparation portion.”
Although the Booker decision did not produce the mayhem and
6
colossal disorder that many commentators predicted, the Court
nevertheless failed to establish a clear remedial sentencing system.
Lower courts struggle not only to properly balance numerous
requisite sentencing factors7 but also with the judicial discretion
Booker reintroduced. As a result of the courts’ expanded interpretive
8
leeway, circuit splits abound on post-Booker issues, and Booker itself
fails to articulate clear standards to resolve those issues.9 “[A] set of
overly complex and rigid rules . . . rendered advisory by a great
judicial shock,” the sentencing system now uncertainly depends on
trial judges’ adherence to the term “advisory” and subsequent
appellate court policing.10 Such post-Booker confusion requires
judges, legal scholars, and Congress alike to hone the sentencing
system to meet the critical standards of constitutionality, clarity, and
consistency.11 This refinement of federal sentencing requires
deciphering and resolving the ambiguities of the Booker decision.

4. Id. at 300–01.
5. Id. at 307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Hyperbole is common in descriptions of the Sentencing Guidelines and the impact of
the Booker decision. E.g., Kris Axtman, Cases Test New Flexibility of Sentencing Guidelines,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 18, 2005, at 2 (“[F]iguring out what to do with all the cases that
have been sentenced under the old guidelines is the closest thing to chaos you can describe.”
(quoting Professor Douglas Berman of the Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law)); Dan
Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Tough Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2005, at A2 (quoting Attorney
General John Ashcroft describing the Booker opinion as “a retreat from justice that may put
the public’s safety in jeopardy”); Myron H. Thompson, Op-Ed., Sentencing and Sensibility, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A23 (advocating increased judicial discretion by analogizing the strict
sentencing guidelines to the extreme punishments imposed by the Athenian leader Draco).
7. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264–65 (summarizing the role of the Guidelines and other
statutory factors during sentencing).
8. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2459 (2007) (considering the circuit split involving
the presumption of reasonableness of the Guidelines); United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the legality of different Guidelines versions and concluding that
changes are not ex post facto laws).
9. David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The Impact of Appellate Review on
Defendants’ Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 173 (2006).
10. Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2005).
11. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175,
194 (2005) (“By encouraging meaningful appellate review and deploying other devices . . . to
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One point of discord arising from Booker involves Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Rule 32(h), entitled “Notice of Possible
Departure from Sentencing Guidelines,” provides:
Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range
on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence
report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the
parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure.
The notice must specify any ground on which the court is contem12
plating a departure.

Rule 32(h) requires a court to provide fair notice to parties when
13
considering a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. The
Booker Court’s decision to make the Guidelines advisory, however,
seemingly renders Rule 32(h) valueless.14 Why would a defendant
need notice of a departure from Guidelines that are only advisory and
not mandatory in nature? Should a defendant really expect a sentence
to fall within the purely advisory Guidelines? In practice, courts’
answers to these questions have been anything but consistent.
Rule 32(h) provides an ideal lens through which to view some of
the dilemmas in the post-Booker world of sentencing. The very
15
existence of Rule 32(h), after Booker, has caused a circuit split with
further uncertainty surrounding the appropriate amount and timing
of notice that must be provided to parties under Rule 32(h).
Consequently, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure has drafted a new version of Rule 32(h),
conforming to the Booker requirements.16 Under the heading of

promote a richer sentencing discourse, Congress can continue to move the federal sentencing
system forward.”).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h).
13. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991) (holding that a district court may
not upwardly depart from the Sentencing Guidelines range without first notifying the parties of
its intent to depart).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 424 (2006) (“Application of the advance notice requirement of Rule 32(h) to
discretionary sentenc[ing] would elevate the advisory sentencing range to a position of
importance that it no longer can enjoy.”).
15. Compare id. at 197 (not requiring a notice requirement for variances from Guidelines
sentences), with United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006) (keeping the
notice requirement of Rule 32(h) even under an advisory Guidelines system).
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Rules_Publication_August_2005.pdf#page=150. The Advisory
Committee, composed of federal judges, practicing lawyers, law professors, state chief justices,
and representatives of the Department of Justice, assists in coordinating and drafting
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“Notice of Intent to Consider Other Sentencing Factors,” the
Advisory Committee suggested:
Before the court may rely on a ground not identified either in the
presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court
must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating
either departing from the applicable guideline range or imposing a
non-guideline sentence. The notice must specify any ground not
earlier identified on which the court is contemplating a departure or
17
a non-guideline sentence.

The proposed adjustments have progressed through various channels
of the amendment process, so far yielding little actual procedural
change. Nevertheless, the proposed amendments have generated
additional considerations for Rule 32(h) and have illustrated the
advantages of gradual, thoughtful fine-tuning of federal sentencing.18
By integrating constitutionality, clarity, and reasonableness,
proposed Rule 32(h) presents a rare accord within the convoluted
world of post-Booker sentencing. Part I of this Note explores the
emergence and current status of Rule 32(h) and Booker to
appropriately contextualize the conflict between the rule of
procedure and the rule of the Court. Part II then illuminates the
apparent conflict between Rule 32(h) and Booker. This discussion
sets the stage for Part III, which explains the value and legitimacy of
proposed Rule 32(h) as a suitable compromise for courts, legislators,
and the public.
I. ARRANGING RULE 32(H) AND BOOKER
Viewing the background and confusion associated with Booker
through the lens of Rule 32(h) helps elucidate the functioning of both
Rule 32(h) and the Booker decision. Understanding the conflict
between Rule 32(h) and Booker requires tracing the chronological
development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Rule 32(h), and
the Booker decision.

appropriate amendments to rules and explanatory committee notes. For a more complete
explanation of the federal rulemaking process, and to see exactly how the Advisory Committee
fits into the scheme of rulemaking, see The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and
Bar October 2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Rules_Publication_August_2005.pdf#page=150.
18. See infra Part II.B (discussing the airing of appropriate issues pertaining to Rule 32(h)).
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A. The Guidelines
Prior to both Rule 32(h) and Booker, increasing crime rates in
the 1970s and 1980s generated an alliance between conservatives and
liberals, resulting in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA).19 The SRA created the Sentencing Commission, and
Congress charged the Commission with three goals: (1) meeting the
SRA’s sentencing purposes, (2) providing certainty and fairness in
sentencing by avoiding unwarranted disparities among defendants
with similar records, and (3) reflecting the advancement in the
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process.20 The Sentencing Commission developed the Sentencing
Guidelines, which prescribed more uniform sentencing ranges for
21
similarly situated offenders. Using a grid of narrow sentencing
ranges, the Guidelines coordinate an offense with offender
22
characteristics to establish sentencing requirements and options.
Adopted in 1987, the Sentencing Guidelines represented “a
watershed in legal history.”23
B. The Emergence of Rule 32(h)
Rule 32(h) emerged in response to the Supreme Court’s 1991
24
decision in Burns v. United States. The Burns Court required prior
notification to both parties if a court intended to upwardly depart
25
from a range mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines. Though, at
the time of the Burns decision, Rule 32 “contain[ed] no express
language requiring a district court to notify the parties of its intent to
make sua sponte departures from the Guidelines,”26 the Court
nevertheless construed Rule 32 to require notice of any consideration
of an upward departure from the mandatory Guidelines range.27 The

19. Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines after
Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2006).
20. Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2000); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (construing the SRA).
21. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 526.1
(3d ed. 2000).
22. Id.
23. Bissonnette, supra note 19, at 1506.
24. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991).
25. Id. at 138–39.
26. Id. at 132.
27. Id. at 136–37.
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Court based its decision on the need for “full adversary testing of the
28
issues relevant to a Guidelines sentence.” Noting that “[n]ot every
silence is pregnant,”29 the Court determined that “Congress did not
intend district courts to depart from the Guidelines sua sponte
30
without first affording notice to the parties.” Subsequently, Congress
added Rule 32(h), entitled “Notice of Possible Departure from
31
Sentencing Guidelines,” to codify the Court’s decision in Burns.
C. The United States v. Booker Segue
In 2005, the Booker opinion addressed the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Guidelines. Booker combined the cases of Freddie J.
Booker and Ducan Fanfan to consider “whether an application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.”32 A
judicial finding that Booker obstructed justice increased his sentence
for drug possession with intent to distribute from twenty-one years
and ten months to thirty years.33 The judge in Fanfan’s drug
possession case, on the other hand, refused to “make ‘any blanket
34
decision about the federal guidelines.’” Instead, the judge based
Fanfan’s sentence “solely upon the guilty verdict” in the case.35
In unusual fashion, the Booker Court issued two seemingly
36
disparate 5–4 opinions by two very different majorities. In the first
Booker opinion (Booker I) Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and

28. Id. at 135.
29. Id. at 136 (quoting Ill., Dep’t of Pub. Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.
1983)).
30. Id. at 136.
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h) advisory committee’s note (indicating that Rule 32(h) reflected
the Burns decision by requiring notice of the specific grounds of a Guidelines departure before
a sentencing court could depart).
32. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
33. Id. at 227.
34. Id. at 229 (quoting Appendix A to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11a, Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (No. 04-105)).
35. Id. (quoting Appendix A to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11a, Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(No. 04-105)).
36. In the first majority opinion of Booker, Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, Justice Souter,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg comprised the majority. Id. at 226. The dissenters,
however, from the first majority opinion embraced the second majority opinion. Justice Breyer,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Ginsburg all agreed
with the second remedial majority. Id. at 244. Justice Ginsburg, the only justice in both
majorities of Booker, did not write to explain her decision.
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37
followed the Court’s budding Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court applied the Sixth Amendment to the sentencing enhancements
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,38 holding that any sentencing
enhancements based on facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt
39
by a jury were unconstitutional. The Court stated that “[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”40 Booker I came as
no great surprise in the legal world because it grew “directly out of a
similar conclusion the same five justices . . . reached . . . in invalidating
the sentencing guidelines system in the state of Washington.”41
Writing for the majority in the second Booker opinion (Booker
II), Justice Breyer attempted to remedy the constitutional flaws in the
Sentencing Guidelines. Booker II rendered the Guidelines advisory
rather than mandatory.42 The Booker II majority excised the
mandatory portions of the Guidelines,43 required that the newly
44
expurgated Guidelines be considered as a factor during sentencing,
and checked the newly fashioned judicial discretion in sentencing by
placing a standard of reasonableness review on appellate courts.45
More specifically, the Justices in Booker II concluded that Congress
would have preferred removing the certain mandatory portions of the
Guidelines that violated the Sixth Amendment instead of invalidating
46
the entire Sentencing Guidelines Act. To comply with this prediction

37. Booker, 543 U.S. at 238, 243–44; cf. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004)
(considering the constitutionality of the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines and holding
that “[o]ur commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects not just respect for longstanding
precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial. That right is no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.”);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (distinguishing sentencing facts from elements
of the offense and holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
38. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229.
39. Id. at 244.
40. Id.
41. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Transforms Use of Sentence Guidelines, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1.
42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46.
43. Id. at 259.
44. Id. at 264.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 249.
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of congressional will, the Court elected to “sever and excise two
specific statutory provisions: the provision that requires sentencing
courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines
range . . . and the provision that sets forth standards of review on
47
appeal.” The Court also selected a reasonableness standard of
review for sentencing considerations at the appellate level, specifying
that § 3553(a), which enumerates the factors that influence
sentencing, serve as the guide for the appellate reasonableness
standard.48 In what amounted to a “remarkable act of judicial
49
jujitsu,” Justice Breyer, seeking to protect the essential pre-Booker
aspects of sentencing, raised a firestorm of criticisms and questions.50
As one commentator remarked, “the remedy,” Booker II, “was the
surprise . . . that will shape the continuing debate over sentencing
policy.”51
D. The Current Tempo of Booker
Booker prompted a variety of reactions from an abundance of
sources. On the judicial front, Booker propelled the federal courts
into uncertainty and transformed the federal sentencing process.52
“U.S. judges across the country are struggling to navigate their
newfound discretion amid thousands of appeals, widespread
confusion and sharp scrutiny from critics who are on guard for soft
punishments.”53 Many courts continue to adhere to Guidelines
recommendations. For instance, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
47. Id. at 259.
48. Id. at 261. The statute indicates:
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence [include] . . . (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)
the need for the sentence imposed . . . ; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for[] (A) the applicable
category of offense . . . ; (5) any pertinent policy statement . . . ; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any
victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
49. Charlie Savage, High Court Overturns Sentencing Guidelines but Ruling Will Allow
Advisory Use by Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2005, at A1 (quoting Professor Frank
Bowman of the Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis).
50. See Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System,
43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 346 n.16 (2006) (“Many commentators have noted the apparent
conceptual confusions in the Booker opinions.”).
51. Greenhouse, supra note 41.
52. Id.
53. Gail Gibson, Judges Left in Confusion on Sentencing, BALT. SUN, Feb. 13, 2005, at 1A.
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Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all applied the presumption of
reasonableness to sentences within Guidelines ranges, giving the
54
Guidelines significant weight as sentencing factors. At the district
court level, some judges also feel obliged to adhere to the Guidelines.
A Nebraska district court judge resolved “that the Guidelines must be
given substantial weight even though they are now advisory. To do
55
otherwise is to thumb our judicial noses at Congress.”
On the other side of the coin, some courts hesitate to apply the
presumption of reasonableness to the Guidelines. The Second Circuit,
for instance, has expressly rejected the presumptive reasonableness of
56
Guidelines sentences. District of Massachusetts Judge Nancy
Gertner, likewise, embraced the judicial flexibility that Booker
provided because she “[s]o many times . . . found [herself] in a
situation where the guideline sentence made no sense in light of the
57
facts.”
The Supreme Court has allowed but has not mandated the
presumptive reasonableness approach to Guidelines sentences. In
58
Rita v. United States, Victor Rita argued that although his sentence
fell within the Guidelines range, it did not adequately account for his
history and characteristics and did not comply with the sentencing
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).59 The Court, however, upheld the
Fourth Circuit’s presumption of reasonableness, stating that “a court
of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district
court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing
Guidelines.”60 Relying on the nonbinding nature of the presumption
and the congressional goals set forth by the Sentencing Guidelines
Act, the Court held that the presumption of reasonableness reflects a
proper balance between deference to the district court and to the
61
Sentencing Commission. The Court also emphasized that “the

54. Bissonnette, supra note 19, at 1523.
55. United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1062 (D. Neb. 2005).
56. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
192 (2006) (“We therefore decline to establish any presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, that a
Guidelines sentence is reasonable.”).
57. Shelley Murphy, 2 Boston Jurists Hail Return of Discretion, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13,
2005, at A20 (quoting Judge Nancy Gertner).
58. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
59. Id. at 2462.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 2465 (“[T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than
having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the
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presumption . . . is an appellate court presumption. . . . Thus, the
sentencing court subjects the defendant’s sentence to thorough
62
adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure.”
Although the Supreme Court’s support for the Fourth Circuit
presumption of reasonableness for Guidelines sentencing in Rita
offers some insight into the Court’s treatment of the Guidelines,
considerable portions of the post-Booker sentencing regime still
confound lower courts. Rita’s consideration of the presumption of
reasonableness debate did not settle the judicial disagreements
associated with the Court’s failure in Booker to describe precisely
how trial courts should employ the Guidelines.63
Looking beyond the judiciary, the Booker decision, by markedly
changing the federal sentencing system, sparked sundry responses by
legislators. Although some congressional leaders, shortly after the
Booker decision, braced for a fight over how much discretion should
be provided to federal judges,64 others advocated restraint from hasty
legislative maneuvers that might further complicate an already
65
opaque system. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen
Specter commented that he intended “to thoroughly review the
Supreme Court’s decision and work to establish a sentencing method
that will be appropriately tough on career criminals, fair, and
consistent with constitutional requirements.”66 Senator Ted Kennedy,
however, warned against “rash action by Congress to impose a
mandatory sentencing regime” to allow a federal sentencing
commission time to recommend reforms.67
Public responses to Booker also varied in substance and source.
With the Department of Justice scrambling to preserve the remaining
authority of the Guidelines, other legal scholars, criminal defense
attorneys, and critics decried the confusion over the Guidelines and
judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate
application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is
reasonable.”).
62. Id.
63. See id. at 2475 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[P]recisely what ‘reasonableness’ review entails
is not dictated by Booker. . . . The Court has reintroduced the constitutional defect that Booker
purported to eliminate. . . . [W]e should have left in place the compulsory Guidelines that
Congress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged scheme of our own.”); Bissonnette,
supra note 19, at 1500.
64. Greenhouse, supra note 41.
65. Savage, supra note 49.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Booker’s effects. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez called on
judges to adhere to uniform sentences, stating, “More and more
frequently, judges are exercising their discretion to impose sentences
that depart from the carefully considered ranges developed by the
68
U.S. Sentencing Commission.” Jon Sands, chairman of the Federal
Defender Guideline Committee, called the Booker opinion
69
“bittersweet,” stating that “the Sixth Amendment was vindicated,
but then it was undercut again, all in one day.”70 On the other hand,
Harvard Law School Professor William Stuntz commented, “[I]n its
own strange, two-part way, Booker gets us to a good result. It may
lead us as close to an ideal system as we may ever get—rules
moderated by mercy.”71 Sentencing expert, Professor Doug Berman
conceded, though, that sorting through the post-Booker issues
requires time and patience in the lower courts.72
E. The Current Tempo of Rule 32(h)
Following the Booker decision, questions concerning the
potential abolishment or amendment of Rule 32(h) began to
circulate. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the first channel in effecting changes to the Criminal
Rules, considered the possible application of Rule 32(h) in light of
Booker.73 The Advisory Committee utilized a subcommittee
specifically designed to analyze the impact of Booker on the Criminal
74
Rules, and “the Subcommittee . . . discussed whether it might be
advisable to delete Rule 32(h) in its entirety but . . . ultimately
decided to leave it in . . . .”75 The Advisory Committee adopted one

68. Alexis Grant, Attorney General Pushing for Harsher Sentences, HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 22, 2005, at A5.
69. Kristina Walter, Note, Booker and Our Brave New World: The Tension Among the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, and a Defendant’s Constitutional Right to
Trial by Jury, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 657, 673 (2005) (quoting Telephone Interview by Mary
Price, Families Against Mandatory Minimum, with Jon Sands, Chairman, Fed. Defender
Guideline Comm. (Jan. 12, 2005)).
70. Id.
71. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker’s Promise, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 521, 521 (quoting Robb London, Aftermath, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2005, at 6).
72. Axtman, supra note 6, at 2.
73. Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 5 (Apr. 4–5, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Minutes/CR04-2005-min.pdf; see supra note 16 (discussing the rulemaking process).
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
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76
77
amended version of Rule 32(h), which received public comments.
In April 2006, responding to concerns, the Committee slightly
amended the language of its proposed draft, unanimously adopting
78
more specific terminology suggested by the Sentencing Commission.
After this alteration, the proposed Rule 32(h), entitled “Notice of
Intent to Consider Other Sentencing Factors,” stated:

Before the court may rely on a ground not identified for departure
or a non-guidelines sentence either in the presentence report or in a
party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the parties
reasonable notice that it is contemplating either departing from the
applicable guideline range or imposing a non-guideline sentence.
The notice must specify any ground not earlier identified for
departing or imposing a non-guideline sentence on which the court is
79
contemplating imposing such a sentence.

Despite the Advisory Committee’s April 2006 modification, the
Standing Committee hesitated to approve the rule, given the “fluid”
80
state of the developing caselaw. In June 2006, it sent the proposed
amendment back to the Advisory Committee,81 which agreed by a 7–4
82
vote at its October 2006 meeting to further consider Rule 32(h). The
Advisory Committee identified four areas of focus for the

76. “[T]he Subcommittee had proposed two alternatives: The first version would make a
distinction between ‘variances’ and ‘departures.’ The second version would make no
distinction. . . . [T]he Committee decided to use the first alternative, with some minor changes,
which included using the term ‘non-guideline sentence’ instead of the term ‘variance.’” Id.
77. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 CRIMINAL RULES COMMENTS CHART,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Rules%202005.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2007) (listing
the public comments for all 2005 Criminal Rules and specifying those applying to Rule 32).
78. See Report from Susan C. Bucklew, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3–4 (May 20,
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CR05-2006.pdf (detailing the adoption
of the Sentencing Commission’s suggested language for Rule 32(h)).
79. Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 6 (Apr. 3–4, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Minutes/CR04-2006-min.pdf; Letter from Judith W. Sheon, Staff Dir., U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, to David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2–3 (Feb. 15, 2006)
(emphasis in original to denote proposed changes to Rule 32(h)), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Comments%202005/05-CR-017.pdf.
80. Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 25–27 (June 22–23, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Minutes/ST06-2006.pdf.
81. Id. at 26–27.
82. Report from Susan C. Bucklew, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2–3 (Dec. 18,
2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CR12-2006.pdf.
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reexamination: (1) the relationship between the Guidelines and other
sentencing factors, (2) the requirement of notice by due process, (3)
the meaning of adequate notice, and (4) specific cases given attention
83
by the Federal Defenders. Rule 32(h) has remained in a somewhat
indeterminate state, subject to the multiplicity of steps and safeguards
in the amendment process for the Criminal Rules.
II. DISSONANCE
The inconsistencies between Rule 32(h) and Booker have
spawned disagreement among the federal courts of appeals, the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the public.
Understanding this dissonance surrounding Rule 32(h) is vital to
ascertaining its significance within the world of sentencing.
A. The Courts Not in Tune
The circuits have split on the post-Booker role of Rule 32(h). On
one hand, the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have applied
Rule 32(h) to all non-Guidelines sentences since Booker.84 On the
other hand, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have determined
that Rule 32(h) has no real effect in light of the Booker holding that
rendered the Guidelines advisory.85
Favoring the notice provided by Rule 32(h), the Fourth Circuit
86
held, in United States v. Davenport, that “notice of an intent to
depart or vary from the guidelines remains a critical part of
87
sentencing post-Booker.” Sentenced to ten years imprisonment for
fraudulently using a credit card, Davenport appealed his sentence as
unreasonable.88 For a number of reasons, including the district court’s
failure to provide notice of its contemplation of a sentence above the
advisory guideline range, the appellate court vacated Davenport’s
sentence.89 The Fourth Circuit clarified its position on Rule 32(h),
stating:

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
See United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing the circuit split).
Id.
United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 374.
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The need for . . . notice is as clear now as before Booker. There is
“essentially no limit on the number of potential factors that may
warrant a departure” or a variance, and neither the defendant nor
the Government “is in a position to guess when or on what grounds
90
a district court might depart” or vary from the guidelines.

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Evans-Martinez91
92
that Criminal Rule 32(h) survived Booker. The court stated that
“[t]he district court’s plain error in failing to provide notice of its
intent to sentence above the Guideline range ‘seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation’ of the sentencing
proceeding.”93 The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits have also
demonstrated support for the post-Booker application of Rule 32(h).94
Conversely, the Third Circuit, in considering Frederick Banks’s
sentence for selling illegally copied versions of Microsoft software
products, firmly concluded, “[T]he District Court . . . was not
obligated to provide advance notice of its intent to vary from . . . [the]
Guidelines sentencing range.”95 In United States v. Walker,96 the
Seventh Circuit correspondingly held that “[t]he element of unfair
surprise that underlay Burns and led to the creation of Rule 32(h) is
no longer present.”97 Thus, the court refused to vacate the defendant’s
98
district court sentence. Because the district court departed from

90. Id. at 371 (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136–37 (1991)).
91. United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006).
92. Id. at 1164.
93. Id. at 1167 (quoting United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005)).
94. See United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[A]s this case illustrates,
it is clearly the better practice—whether or not the legal requirement survives Booker—for the
court to provide notice to defendants when relying on departure provisions in the advisory
guidelines not previously identified . . . .”); United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
2006) (“The existence of the calculated Guidelines range as the starting point for either type of
sentence makes the Burns rationale as appropriate for a non-Guidelines sentence as for a
departure.”); United States v. Dozier, 444 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We do not question
the viability of Rule 32(h) and Burns after Booker.”).
95. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 424 (2006).
96. United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 314 (2006).
97. Id. at 1007–08. But see United States v. Sharp, 436 F.3d 730, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that “if the [presentence report] or the prosecutor’s recommendation does not identify
the basis for the potential sentencing increase, then ‘the Judge must inform the defendant, a
sufficient time in advance of sentencing (i.e. [sic] not during the actual sentencing), of the
specific grounds that the court is considering relying on to increase the terms of confinement.’”
(quoting United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 1994))).
98. Walker, 447 F.3d at 1007–08.
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advisory Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit included Rule 32(h) in the
99
extended sentencing discretion of Booker. The Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits reached comparable conclusions.100
The amount of notice required by Rule 32(h) has fostered
further disagreement. By refusing to answer questions regarding the
amount and timing of notice, the Burns Court set the tone for
uncertainty among the appellate courts on the subject.101 Most courts
agree that information in the presentence report (PSR) or prehearing
102
submission satisfies the notice requirement of existing Rule 32(h).
Doubt, however, may arise on the actual amount and timing of notice
required when a court considers a sentence outside a calculated
Guidelines range. Is informing a defendant at a sentencing hearing
sufficient, or is prior notice required? If prior notice is required, how
much prior notice is sufficient? The circuit courts have not issued any
bright-line rules concerning the amount or timing of proper notice.
Though some courts have pronounced certain information, like that
contained in the PSR or prehearing submission, as satisfying
requirements for appropriate timing and notice, by and large, the
circuit courts do not venture beyond the precise situations presented.
In fact, most circuits simply state a reasonableness standard, like that
of the Fifth Circuit, which provides for “reasonable notice . . . on a
ground not identified for departure in either the presentence report
or in a party’s prehearing submission.”103 The Second Circuit also
generally requires “prior notice . . . [that] will facilitate a defendant’s
opportunity to contest the factual premises of the sentencing judge’s
view.”104 The circuit courts primarily determine the reasonableness of

99. Id. at 1007.
100. United States v. Simmerer, 156 F. App’x 124, 128 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 1599 (2006) (“There is no precedent from this court or from the Supreme Court establishing
that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 applies to a post-Booker upward variance.”); United States v.
Egenberger, 424 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2005) (“This is not a case where the defendant was
entitled to notice that the court, in its Sentencing Guidelines calculations, was contemplating an
upward departure . . . .”).
101. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 139 (1991).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 44 n.14 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is clearly
the better practice . . . for the court to provide notice to defendants when relying on departure
provisions in the advisory guidelines not previously identified in the PSR or in a party’s prehearing submission.”); United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We have
consistently held that the notice requirement may be satisfied by information in the PSR.”).
103. Allison, 447 F.3d at 406.
104. United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 2006).
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notice provided but do not illustrate specifics of sufficient notice and
sufficient timing of notice.
B. The Cadence of the Drafters and the Public
Disagreement over Rule 32(h) has not ended with the courts.
The Advisory Committee’s consideration of proposed Rule 32(h)
introduced several matters for deliberation. Following the Advisory
Committee’s proposal for a revised, post-Booker Rule 32(h), the
Committee received various public comments regarding the
predominance of the Guidelines; the use of certain terminology in the
proposed rule; and potentially undesirable consequences from the
105
proposed rule, like procedural complications and extra court costs.
Public opinion regarding the proposed rule principally has
focused on the primacy of the Guidelines and the use of outdated
terminology. For instance, Chief U.S. Probation Officer Tony
Garoppolo wrote, “This proposal effectively gives primacy to the
sentencing guidelines as a factor for the Court to consider in
sentencing, but neither Section 3553(a) or Booker give the guidelines
106
such primacy.” Even the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL), which wholeheartedly supported the continued
applicability of Rule 32(h) once it appropriately conformed with
Booker, conceded, “[T]he proposed amendment simply substitutes
107
new language that perpetuates the primacy of the guidelines . . . .”
Federal Public Defender Jon M. Sands, however, countered the
concern over Guidelines primacy with a statement about the reality of
sentencing, noting that “[o]f all of the statutory factors courts must
now consider, only the guideline range has a number attached to it.
Thus, whether treated as advisory or presumptive, the guidelines
continue to be the single most determinative factor of a defendant’s
sentence length.”108 The formulation of Criminal Rule 32(h) and

105. See supra note 77 (indicating the public comments).
106. Letter from Tony Garoppolo, Chief U.S. Prob. Officer, to Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure (Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Comments%
202005/05-CR-002.pdf [hereinafter Garoppolo Letter].
107. Letter from William J. Genego & Peter Goldberger, Co-Chairs, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal
Def. Lawyers Comm. on Rules of Procedure, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Standing Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure 5 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
CR%20Comments%202005/05-CR-020.pdf [hereinafter NACDL Letter].
108. Letter from Jon M. Sands, Fed. Pub. Defender, to Peter G. McGabe, Comm. on Rules
of Practice & Procedure 1 (Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter
Sands Letter].
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public comments surrounding it illustrate the ongoing debate over the
primacy of the Guidelines.
Drafting a post-Booker version of Rule 32(h) also has involved a
difference of opinion over certain terminology. Some courts of
appeals distinguish between the treatment of a departure and the
109
treatment of a variance. To clarify the distinction, a departure is a
sentence both outside of the Guidelines range and outside of the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. A variance is a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range but within the discretion of the § 3553(a) factors and
Booker. This distinction between departures and variances led the
Advisory Committee to consider two possibilities in drafting
proposed Rule 32(h), one including a lingual distinction and one
abandoning the differentiation between variance and departure. The
Committee adopted a distinction for the draft of Rule 32(h), using the
terms “departure” and, in place of variance, “non-guideline
sentence.”110 The Committee’s choice failed to please the public fully.
Chief Probation Officer Garoppolo expressed concern over the
111
and the NACDL
outdated nature of the term “departure,”
communicated dissatisfaction with “[r]eferences to a court’s engaging
in the act of ‘departing’ and references to ‘the applicable guideline
range’ and to a ‘non-guideline sentence.’”112 The NACDL felt that
these references were unnecessary to conform Rule 32(h) to the
requirements of Booker and that continued use of such terms
impeded the transformation to post-Booker sentencing, which
revolves around all factors of § 3553(a).113
Finally, the proposed version of Rule 32(h) has aroused
apprehensions regarding potential procedural complications and costs
associated with unnecessary court time. Judge Stewart Dalzell
pointed out that the proposed version of Rule 32(h) “assures that
many, if not most, sentencing hearings will have to take place at least
twice, with consequent costs to the parties, victims, and public who all

109. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 424 (2006) (holding that a variance is not subject to a notice requirement, but
“if a court is contemplating a departure, it should continue to give notice as it did before
Booker”).
110. See supra Part I.E (detailing the Advisory Committee’s choices for Rule 32(h)).
111. Garoppolo Letter, supra note 106.
112. NACDL Letter, supra note 107, at 5.
113. Id.; see supra note 48 (listing the § 3553(a) factors for sentencing).
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114
have a right to attend such important proceedings.” The judge
noted that some considerations of § 3553(a), such as a defendant’s
remorse, are not discernable until the sentencing hearing.115 Thus,
notice of consideration of an outside-Guidelines sentence, which
includes both departures and variances, based on these later matters
could only take place at the sentencing hearing.116 Notice would then
117
necessitate a subsequent hearing, complicating the court’s schedule.
Rule 32(h) must therefore be viewed amidst circuit court,
Committee, and public disagreements. These discrepancies form the
analytical foundation for consideration of Rule 32(h).

III. THE RIGHT HARMONY
The process of criminal sentencing constantly evolves, influenced
by a plethora of factors and contributors both inside and outside the
courtroom.118 “Especially after United States v. Booker, sentencing is
an art, not a science.”119 Contemplated as an art form, sentencing
inexorably involves “a veritable parade of actors, including
legislators, sentencing commissioners, police officers, prosecutors,
juries, trial judges, appellate judges, and executive branch officials.”120
The Supreme Court maintains that different branches of the
government should “converse with each other on matters of vital
common interest,”121 and Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Blakely v.
122
Washington, applied this cooperation to the sentencing process,
stating, “Constant, constructive discourse between our courts and our
legislatures is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional
design . . . . Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this
collaborative process.”123

114. Letter from Judge Stewart Dalzell, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa., to Susan C.
Bucklew, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 (Nov. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CR%20Comments%202005/05-CR-006.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See generally Chanenson, supra note 11 (detailing the evolution of federal criminal
sentencing).
119. United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006).
120. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 175.
121. Id. at 175–76 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)).
122. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
123. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 175 n.2 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
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The Court’s application of the Constitution to sentencing in
124
Apprendi v. New Jersey, Blakely, and Booker offers refreshing
possibilities for reevaluating the sentencing system. In fact, these
holdings “offer a rare opportunity for reassessing and recommitting
to the good principles and bipartisan spirit that shaped the SRA.
Congress can learn from years of experience and commentary on the
Federal Guidelines system and from guidelines systems in many
states . . . .”125 Ultimately, post-Booker sentencing changes largely rest
in the hands of Congress. Justice Breyer even conceded, “Ours, of
course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress’ court. The
National Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the
sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress
126
judges best for the federal system of justice.” Nevertheless, cues
from sources like the courts, the Advisory Committee, and the public
remain important for any further congressional action in sentencing.127
Mindful of § 3553(a)(2)’s four essential purposes of retribution,
128
these entities
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,
continually work to clarify details and set the stage for congressional
action.
129
With proposed Rule 32(h), the Advisory Committee has
assisted congressional action in sentencing by elegantly crafting a rule
that melds diametric post-Booker viewpoints into a workable
solution. Proposed Rule 32(h) provides for uniformity consistent with
the congressional desires underlying the Sentencing Guidelines.
Moreover, proposed Rule 32(h) conforms to the constitutional
requirements set forth in Booker and Burns, even affording
additional Fifth Amendment due process protection. Finally,
proposed Rule 32(h) affords clarity to the post-Booker confusion of
sentencing and buttresses the idea of reasonableness presented in
Booker II. In short, proposed Rule 32(h) is a pragmatic, guiding step
for future congressional action. It finesses a rare and valuable post-

124. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
125. Weisberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 2.
126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005).
127. It is worthwhile to note that “sentencing law and policy reflect the decisions of many
actors . . . changes in rules, procedures, or decisions by one actor can have a hydraulic impact on
other actors and . . . responses by those actors are not always predictable.” Weisberg & Miller,
supra note 10, at 20–21.
128. See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (discussing these four penal
goals).
129. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Booker blend of congressional desires with constitutional mandates
alongside clarity and reasonableness.
A. Congressional and Constitutional Notes
Reconciling the congressional desire for uniformity with the
130
constitutional aspects of the Booker decision is difficult at best. The
notice requirement of proposed Rule 32(h) nonetheless satisfies
congressional desires for uniformity in sentencing, complies with
constitutional mandates, and furthers fairness and due process.
First, proposed Rule 32(h) bolsters the congressional goal of
sentencing uniformity by better ensuring the fairness of a nonGuidelines sentence or a sentence departing from the Guidelines.
Both the majority and the dissenters in Booker II agreed that
131
Congress intended to create uniformity in sentencing. By requiring
notice for any sentence imposed outside of the Guidelines, regardless
of whether it is characterized as a variance or departure, Rule 32(h)
adds an extra check on the judicial discretion permitted by Booker.
Rule 32(h) ensures that courts more fairly consider all sentencing
factors of § 3553(a) in the adversarial process and that courts
reasonably justify sentences outside of the Guidelines. Through these
checks, Rule 32(h) promotes the congressional goal of uniformity.
Second, proposed Rule 32(h) satisfies constitutional demands.
As the Court has stated, “Where rights secured by the Constitution
are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would
132
abrogate them.” Thus, Rule 32(h) must comply not only with the
demands of Booker but also with the prior demands of Burns. The
constitutional debate surrounding Rule 32(h) primarily emerges from
the incompatibility of Booker II with Burns. Though the Court
shaped the Burns decision around mandatory Guidelines, Booker II
implemented advisory Guidelines. Decided at different times under
different sentencing systems, the Burns and Booker decisions are not
entirely reconcilable. Nevertheless, discussing and formulating Rule
130. See Weisberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 8 (“Booker undermines the constitutional
legitimacy of rigid, judicially determined Guidelines . . . .”); see also Bissonnette, supra note 19,
at 1534 (“Indeed, it is difficult to craft a role for the Guidelines that embraces congressional
intent while following Booker’s Sixth Amendment holding. Although it seems that the remedial
majority aimed to carve out a niche between indeterminate sentencing and a mandatory
Guidelines system, this middle ground, as one scholar has noted, may not actually exist.”).
131. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN.
L. REV. 749, 749 (2006).
132. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).
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32(h) requires respecting the policies and mandates of both Burns
and Booker.
The proposed version of Rule 32(h) complies with the
precedents of Burns and Booker, adequately balancing the mandates
of the two Supreme Court opinions. The current draft of Rule 32(h)
eliminates the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines as
directed by Booker. The subheading change from “Notice of Possible
Departure from Sentencing Guidelines” to “Notice of Intent to
Consider Other Sentencing Factors” synchronizes the rule to Booker
by “removing the language that (now) incorrectly gives exclusive
133
focus to the guidelines.”
Though the revised subheading admittedly might suggest the
primacy of the Guidelines, the language simply reflects the reality of
the sentencing system. All of the courts of appeals require a
Guidelines calculation,134 and this calculation is the only § 3553(a)
factor with a numerical value.135 Moreover, as of March 2006, the
United States Sentencing Commission reported that 85.9 percent of
post-Booker federal cases resulted in sentences within the Guidelines
range or below the Guidelines range with government sponsorship;
62.2 percent of those cases used sentences actually within the
Guidelines range.136 More importantly, only 1.6 percent of federal
cases after Booker applied sentences above the Guidelines range,
137
meaning both upward departures and variances. “[T]he defendant,
defense counsel, and the prosecutor rely first and foremost on the
guidelines in making critical decisions, such as whether or not to
plead guilty and if so, on what terms.”138
This is especially true for the defendant. If courts generally
sentence above the Guidelines range in less than 2 percent of cases, a
sentence within or below the Guidelines range seems a particularly
reasonable expectation on the part of the defendant and the
defendant’s counsel. Because judges are required to calculate the

133. NACDL Letter, supra note 107, at 5.
134. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 179.
135. See Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1 (“Of all of the statutory factors courts must now
consider, only the guideline range has a number attached to it.”).
136. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 46, 62 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker_
report/Booker_Report.pdf.
137. Id. The government sponsored an additional 23.7 percent of sentences below the
Guidelines range. Id.
138. Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1.
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Guidelines range and to consider the range calculated, components of
139
the Guidelines remain highly influential. Although Booker does not
specifically articulate the primacy of the Guidelines, Booker II
140
requires justification for sentences diverging from the Guidelines.
An assumption of a Guidelines or lower sentence is thus rational,
particularly for defendants. Proposed Rule 32(h) therefore complies
with the Booker decision in the most practical manner.
In addition to complying with Booker, proposed Rule 32(h) also
incorporates the directives of the Burns decision. Burns remains good
law, and, given that Rule 32(h) directly implements that decision, the
fundamental aspects of Rule 32(h) must stay intact. Some courts of
appeals argue that the advisory nature of the Guidelines
automatically provides defendants notice of any sentence outside of
the Guidelines so long as the factors considered are the same as those
141
in § 3553(a), but these courts disregard the Burns holding and its
important element of fairness. Of course, some tweaking of Rule
32(h) is necessary in light of Booker, but only slight nuances and the
suggestion of the mandatory nature of the Guidelines must be
adjusted to bring Rule 32(h) into line with the Booker decision.
The Burns holding, although decided when the Guidelines were
mandatory, still established fundamental principles for sentencing,
which should not be swept under the rug of Booker complications.
Citing the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, the
Burns Court stated, “When a reasonable dispute exists about any
factor important to the sentencing determination, the court must
ensure that the parties have an adequate opportunity to present
142
relevant information.” Even before the existence of Rule 32(h), the
Court held that Rule 32 “provide[d] for focused, adversarial
development of the factual and legal issues relevant to determining
the appropriate Guidelines sentence.”143 In other words, Rule 32
contained an implicit notice requirement under the mandatory
Guidelines regime. The same concept of fair adversarial proceeding

139. Weisberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 18.
140. Chanenson, supra note 11, at 181.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 424 (2006) (“Because defendants are aware that district courts will consider the
factors set forth in § 3553(a), we believe the element of ‘unfair surprise’ that Burns sought to
eliminate is not present.”).
142. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 133 (1991) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (1990)) (emphasis omitted).
143. Id. at 134.
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present under a mandatory Guidelines system is present under an
144
advisory Guidelines system. The Second Circuit substantiated this
notion in United States v. Anati,145 stating, “In Burns, the Supreme
Court was concerned not only with unfair surprise, but with the
facilitation, through notice, of adversarial testing of factual and legal
considerations relevant to sentencing. Notice permits the parties to
focus their attention on the considerations upon which the resulting
sentence will rest.”146 Other circuits agree that the underlying
principle of Burns, requiring notice of upward departures or
147
variances, should remain in place.
Finally, proposed Rule 32(h) dispels any due process concerns
regarding a defendant’s notice requirement at sentencing. This
version of Rule 32(h) strengthens the often-neglected Fifth
148
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding the sentencing process.
Although some courts such as the Fourth Circuit consciously address
149
due process at sentencing, other courts, including the Third,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, “tak[e] advantage of the Fifth
Amendment void left by Booker to erode the few procedural
protections defendants enjoy at sentencing.”150
“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but . . . at a minimum they require
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the

144. See Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1 (urging the Rules Advisory Committee to
propose an amendment to Rule 32(h) that “would require courts to give reasonable notice when
contemplating a sentence outside the guideline range”).
145. United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2006).
146. Id. at 237 (internal citation omitted).
147. See United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that
without affording a defendant the right to comment on an upward departure, “a critical
sentencing determination [could] go untested by the adversarial process” (quoting Burns, 501
U.S. at 137)); United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[N]either the
defendant nor the Government ‘is in a position to guess when or on what grounds a district
court might depart’ or vary from the guidelines.” (quoting Burns, 501 U.S. at 136–37)).
148. The Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence lags behind its Sixth, and the lack of
procedural protections for defendants at sentencing undercuts Sixth Amendment advances. In
fact, the leading case concerning due process limits at sentencing is the 1949 decision in Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Anne E. Blanchard & Sarah G. Gannett, Fifth Amendment
Protections at Sentencing: The Next Logical Step After Booker, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 258, 258
(2006).
149. Davenport, 445 F.3d at 371.
150. Blanchard & Gannett, supra note 148, at 258.
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151
nature of the case.” Notice and the opportunity to be heard may be
implemented in a number of ways, and the requirements of due
process demand interpretation by the courts.152 To clarify procedural
due process, the Court propounded a balancing test in Mathews v.
153
Eldridge. This three-part test analyzes the interest affected, the risk
of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used,
154
and the government’s interest.
The dissenters in Burns applied the Mathews test to the upward
155
Guidelines departure. As to the first step, the dissenters conceded
that a defendant’s interest in receiving a sentence not higher than the
upper limit of the Guidelines was clearly substantial.156 In analyzing
the second part of the Mathews test, however, the dissenters
concluded that “both the risk of error under the procedures already
required and the probable value of a further notice requirement are
sufficiently low that the current sentencing scheme passes
constitutional muster.”157
Booker complicated procedural protections, countering the
argument of the Burns dissenters that existing processes satisfy
158
protective due process requirements. First, the opportunity to
address the court at the sentencing hearing is inadequate as a
procedural protection if the defendant or the government has no way
of knowing what issues to prepare.159 The Burns majority agreed,
“‘Th[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is
160
informed’ that a decision is contemplated.” The Court further

151. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1037 (2d ed. 2005)
(providing an overview of procedural due process requirements).
152. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 151, at 1037.
153. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
154. Id. at 335 (“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”).
155. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 148–53 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 149.
157. Id. at 150.
158. Id. at 153–54.
159. Sands Letter, supra note 108, at 1–2; see also United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 235–
36 (2d Cir. 2006) (detailing the importance of fair, adversarial proceedings).
160. Burns, 501 U.S. at 136 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)).
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stated, “At best, . . . parties will address possible sua sponte
departures in a random and wasteful way by trying to anticipate and
negate every conceivable ground on which the district court might
161
choose to depart on its own initiative.” Second, the current standard
of reasonableness for appellate review creates a quandary for
appellate courts and provides further confusion.162 Justice Scalia,
dissenting in Booker, disparaged the coherence of the reasonableness
163
standard for appellate review, describing it as “positively Delphic.”
An uncertain standard, such as the reasonableness standard for
appellate review of sentencing, provides little reassurance of
adequate procedural due process.
On the value of notice itself, the dissenters in Burns noted,
“Because a defendant thus has no need for evidentiary litigation, he
has no need for notice of judicial intentions in order to focus the
164
presentation of evidence.” Given the broader spectrum of judicial
discretion post-Booker and the constitutional demand that “parties
have an adequate opportunity to present relevant information,”165
notice plays an even more important role during the post-Booker
sentencing process. Foreseeing every possible factor that a judge
might consider under § 3553(a) is impossible,166 and providing some
warning of elements that need preparation before advocacy seems
reasonable.
The third step of the Mathews test examines the government
167
interest in having a notice requirement at sentencing. Here, it is
worthwhile to emphasize that the notice requirement of Rule 32(h)
168
covers both upward and downward departures or variances.
Particularly given the more frequent occurrence of below-Guidelines
sentencing,169 the government might also appreciate a notice

161. Id.
162. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 303 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the standard of reasonableness for appellate review).
163. Id. at 311.
164. Burns, 501 U.S. at 152 (Souter, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 133 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (1990)).
166. Id. at 136.
167. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343–47 (1976).
168. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (applying Rule 32(h) to both upward and
downward departures and variances).
169. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 136, at 46–47 (providing statistics
demonstrating more downward departures and variances than upward departures and
variances).
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requirement at sentencing so that it can adequately prepare
arguments against a downward departure or variance. In United States
v. Walker, the government conceded that “due process concerns may
still require a district court to provide notice and opportunity to be
heard on any contemplated departure or imposition of a nonGuideline sentence.”170 Despite the government’s due process
concerns and desire to withdraw its argument detailing the
inapplicability of Rule 32(h) to post-Booker sentences outside of the
Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit simply noted and dismissed the
171
government position, refusing to change its view on Rule 32(h).
Similarly in United States v. Anati:
[T]he Government indicated its agreement with Anati’s position
that the District Court was required to give notice prior to imposing
a non-Guidelines sentence. It further conceded that, in the
circumstances of this case, “the failure to give such notice was not
harmless and that therefore . . . the case should be remanded to the
172
District Court for resentencing.”

The government understandably might support the presence of a
notice requirement during sentencing, and any Mathews concern
about government disagreement wanes.
Though courts and scholars often tiptoe around directly
employing the due process analysis to notice of a departure or nonGuidelines sentence, applying the Mathews test demonstrates that
such notice is a necessary and realistic component of due process at
sentencing. Thus, notice under Rule 32(h) given at sentencing is an
essential element of procedural due process.
B. Clear Rhythms
Proposed Rule 32(h) traverses beyond merely satisfying varying
congressional and constitutional demands. The suggested rule also
provides rare clarity to the sentencing process by requiring notice
both for sentences departing from the Guidelines and for sentences
varying from the Guidelines. The rule, taking into account the lower
courts’ disagreements over terminology, incorporates both variances,

170. United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1007 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
314 (2006).
171. Id.
172. United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 236 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Letter from David
C. James, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to Roseann B. MacKechnie (Apr. 12, 2006)).
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or in the language of the rule itself, non-Guidelines sentences and
173
departures from Guidelines ranges. In other words, the rule
eliminates the possibility that a court will use a terminological
distinction to avoid providing notice for sentences that use the
§ 3553(a) factors but do not stay within the Guidelines range.
Implementing the revised version of Rule 32(h) provides lower courts
with clear, explicit directives that require providing notice to
defendants at sentencing if a court considers any departure or
variance. Further, the most recent version of the rule, proposed by
the Sentencing Commission, narrows what constitutes notice by
specifically requiring identification of information in the PSR or
prehearing submission that could form the basis for a departure or
variance from the Guidelines range.174 By abolishing confusing
semantics and adding more specific requirements, the terminology in
proposed Rule 32(h) generates additional clarity in the post-Booker
world of sentencing.
C. The Reasonable Melody
In assessing appellate review of sentences under the new
sentencing regime, Booker II instituted a reasonableness standard.175
Though facing harsh criticism regarding the ambiguity surrounding
reasonableness, Justice Breyer nonetheless concluded that the Court
“must view fears of a ‘discordant symphony,’ ‘excessive disparities,’
176
and ‘havoc’ . . . with a comparative eye.” In fact, Breyer dubbed the
reasonableness underscored in Booker II as practical and “not foreign
to sentencing law.”177 Proposed Rule 32(h) provides a small
illustration of exactly what Breyer meant by reasonableness in the
context of sentencing. Proposed Rule 32(h) supports congressional
intent, meets constitutional requirements, and adds clarity to
sentencing. Most importantly, proposed Rule 32(h) is fair to
defendants, the government, and courts alike.
Consider the following cases. In the Northern District of Texas, a
178
defendant pled guilty to illegal reentry following deportation. The

173.
32(h)).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra note 79 and accompanying text (illustrating the narrowed scope of Rule
Letter from Judith W. Sheon, supra note 79, at 2.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005).
Id. at 263 (quoting id. at 313 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 262.
Sands Letter, supra note 108 (discussing an unpublished decision).
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court calculated a Guidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-seven
months. The PSR, however, indicated several prior convictions for
driving while intoxicated and one dismissed charge for sexual assault
179
of a minor. Lacking any mitigating or aggravating factors supporting
a Guidelines departure, the judge imposed a sentence of 120 months
without any notice of an upward consideration to the defendant.180
The judge justified his decision by stating that the defendant would
have been convicted of sexual assault of a minor if the minor had not
moved back to Mexico. The PSR contained no specific information
about the sexual assault, and the judge failed to say where he
obtained his information. With no notice that such information would
be introduced at sentencing, the defendant had no opportunity to
181
contest the consideration of the sexual assault charge. Similarly, a
court in Alabama sentenced a mentally retarded defendant to life in
prison when the Guidelines range for the crime suggested only a
period of years.182 The government introduced, without notice, a
prison disciplinary report detailing an altercation between the
defendant and a prison guard. The judge at sentencing subsequently
based his decision to upwardly depart from the Guidelines on this
report. Again, the defendant, with no notice that the report would be
introduced at sentencing, had no opportunity to challenge the
presentation or the validity of the report.183
Although these cases may be rarities in the criminal justice
system given the miniscule percentage of federal cases that result in
above-Guidelines sentences post-Booker, they nevertheless intimate
an undeniable sense of unfairness. The implementation of proposed
Rule 32(h) and the added procedural protection of notice might have
prevented these defendants from receiving exorbitant sentences
based on unexpected information. At the very least, with Rule 32(h)
steadfastly in place, these defendants would have had a full and fair
opportunity to challenge the unanticipated information upon which
their sentences were based.

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (discussing an unpublished decision).
Id.
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Some courts suggest that the notice requirement of proposed
184
Rule 32(h) unnecessarily complicates the sentencing system. On the
contrary, the notice requirement is very reasonable within the scheme
of sentencing. Concerns like those of Judge Dalzell, which posit
excessive procedural costs, exaggerate the effect that Rule 32(h)
would have on courts.185 According to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, upward departures or variances from the Guidelines
occur in less than 2 percent of all sentences, and downward
departures or variances not sponsored by the government comprise
186
only around 12.5 percent of cases. These statistics might lead to the
suggestion that 14.5 percent of cases would potentially require a
continuance based on a requirement for outside-Guidelines notice at
sentencing. In the context of Rule 32(h), however, these numbers
acquire slightly different meanings. First, at least four circuits have
already decisively implemented an outside-Guidelines notice
requirement at sentencing,187 meaning Rule 32(h) would not affect the
dockets of cases in these circuits. Second, many appellate courts
currently have notice requirements for Guidelines departures, but not
for Guidelines variances.188 A substantial proportion of the cases
identified by the Sentencing Commission would not be affected by
proposed Rule 32(h) and thus would not significantly affect the cost
of current sentencing.189 In fact, disregarding sentences constituting
actual departures from the Guidelines, only about 11.7 percent of
sentences could possibly require a continuance.190 Considering the

184. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (outlining Judge Dalzell’s criticisms of
proposed Rule 32(h)).
185. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (same).
186. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (showing sentencing statistics).
187. See supra Part II.A (discussing the circuits supporting post-Booker Rule 32(h) notice).
188. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (clarifying the typical differentiation
between a departure and a variance).
189. The Sentencing Commission percentages can be separated into departures and
variances. Given that a number of the circuits suggest that notice at sentencing is fair for
sentences using information outside of the § 3553(a) factors, only the statistics for variances
might constitute any sort of real procedural complication for the judiciary.
190. Below-Guidelines departures not related to Booker or § 3553(a), and therefore
considered departures, equal 2.2 percent of cases. Above-Guidelines departures not related to
Booker or § 3553(a), and therefore also considered departures, equal 0.2 percent. The
remaining statistics represent the variances and sentences outside of the Guidelines for
unspecified reasons. Addition of these numbers yields approximately 10.3 percent for
downward variances or unspecified sentences and 1.4 percent for upward variances or
unspecified sentences; thus, approximately 11.7 percent of the total sentences are variances or
unspecified. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 136, at 62.
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post-Booker application of Rule 32(h) in a number of circuits and
discounting the cases of Guidelines departures, even fewer cases
might actually require additional procedural costs, hearings, or
continuances.
Moreover, slight inconveniences to the court pale in comparison
to the meaningful principles of fairness and justice that Rule 32(h)’s
notice requirement incorporates into sentencing. In Booker, Justice
Stevens wrote, “[T]he interest in fairness and reliability protected by
the right to a jury trial . . . has always outweighed the interest in
191
concluding trials swiftly.” Similarly, the interests in fairness and
reliability protected by reasonable notice at sentencing outweigh the
court’s interest in greater efficiency for what probably amounts to
much less than 11.7 percent of cases. The holding in Burns
substantiates this notion.192 Fairness to a defendant and due process
outweigh any concern over possible continuance or complication of
the sentencing system for the courts.
In the end, proposed Rule 32(h) is a perfectly reasonable
implementation of increased fairness at sentencing. As such, it will
help ensure the reasonableness of sentencing suggested by Justice
Breyer in Booker II.
CONCLUSION
With Justice Scalia’s “discordant symphony” playing in the
background, judges, legislators, and commentators have worked to
refine the post-Booker world of sentencing. Creating an appropriate
response to Booker requires thoughtfulness and patience,193 not
“knee-jerk, quick-fix solutions.”194 In the meantime, the Booker Court
“has fashioned a reasonable remedy that will allow courts to conduct
195
business until Congress decides how to act.” While the sentencing
system operates under Booker, the interim before congressional
action allows the opportunity for extensive commentary and
thoughtful approaches to sentencing.

191. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
192. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137–38 (1991).
193. Walter, supra note 69, at 683.
194. Gibson, supra note 53 (quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, George Washington University
law professor).
195. Savage, supra note 49.
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Although this Note does not reveal any perfect solution to the
complications of sentencing, it does offer a workable solution to one
of a myriad of post-Booker dilemmas. With any change to the
composition of Congress or to the Supreme Court, the outcomes of
congressional action or the resultant judicial checks on changes to the
sentencing system are enigmatic. In accordance with Booker,
proposed Rule 32(h) instills constitutional compliance, clarity, and a
sense of reasonableness in sentencing. Given the seemingly
incompatible Booker majorities, the divergent responses to the
Booker opinion, and the confounded jurists and legislators
approaching the Booker mandates, adopting proposed Rule 32(h)
would bring an encouraging measure of harmony to the federal
sentencing system.

